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Natural Disasters and Political Participation: Evidence
from the 2002 and 2013 Floods in Germany⇤†‡
Lukas Rudolph§ Patrick M. Kuhn¶
Abstract
How do natural disasters a↵ect electoral participation? The existing social science
literature o↵ers contradictory predictions. A considerable body of research in sociology
and psychology suggests that traumatic events can inspire pro-social behaviour, which
might increase turnout. Yet, political science has long held that even minor changes to
participation costs of low benefit activities can lead to considerable drops in civic en-
gagement. Consequently, natural disasters should reduce electoral participation. We
show how these distinct views can be jointly analysed within the Riker-Ordeshook
model of voting. This paper then reports results on the impact of the 2002 and 2013
floods in Germany on turnout in federal and state elections in Saxony and Bavaria,
conducted few weeks after the floods. Analyzing community level turnout data, and
drawing on a di↵erence-in-di↵erences framework, we find that flood exposure has a
consistent negative e↵ect on turnout. This indicates that the increase in the costs of
voting outweighed any increase in political engagement in our case and stands in con-
trast to findings from developing contexts, where flood management was convincingly
linked to electoral participation.
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INTRODUCTION
What is the impact of natural disasters on politics? With an expected increase in the
frequency of weather extremes in the future due to climate change,1 addressing this question
is important. Previous research on this topic has focused predominately on the impact of
natural disasters on incumbent vote shares. While one part of the literature considers any
e↵ect of natural disasters on candidates’ vote shares as blind retrospection2, another part
sees natural disasters as an opportunity for voters to observe their government’s reaction,
learn about its type, and condition their vote accordingly.3 Comparatively few studies have
considered explicitly how natural disasters a↵ect political participation.4
This paper investigates the impact of two natural disasters in Germany, two floods termed
‘one hundred year events’, on voter turnout. The existing social science literature o↵ers con-
tradictory predictions for such events. On the one hand, research in sociology and psychology
suggests that traumatic events, such as natural disasters, can inspire pro-social behaviour5
and lead to grass-roots creation of self-help organizations,6 both of which have been shown to
be positively correlated with political engagement and thereby turnout.7 On the other hand,
political science has long argued that economic resources are critical ingredients for civic
engagement.8 This literature models political participation as a regular consumption deci-
sion, requiring time and money. Consequentially, the destruction of economic resources and
potential dislocation due to natural disasters should therefore dampen turnout in a↵ected
communities.
We show that these distinct views can be jointly analysed within the Riker and Or-
deshook9 model of voting. We then empirically investigate the impact of natural disasters
on political participation, specifically of the 2002 Elbe flood on federal election turnout in
Saxony and the 2013 Danube flood on voting in federal and state elections in Bavaria. Both
floods occurred close to elections and – especially in 2002 – played an important role in shap-
ing the dynamics of the electoral campaigns.10 The two German states Saxony and Bavaria
are interesting contexts, since they di↵er in at least two important aspects: experience with
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democracy and average economic well-being. This enables us to see if and how e↵ects of
similar types of natural disaster vary. Paying close attention to causal identification in our
research design, we find a consistent, though moderate-sized negative impact of flood ex-
posure on turnout, especially among the most severely flooded communities (e↵ects range
between 0.35 and 0.65 percentage points). Our results suggest that, at least in the German
context, the increase in costs of voting outweighed any increase in political engagement in
the aftermath of the floods.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Among the studies that have looked at how natural disasters a↵ect turnout, empirical results
are mixed. Combining geo-coded flood data, o cial election returns from national and
provincial assembly elections, and a large district-level representative survey to study the
impact and mechanism of the 2010-11 Pakistani floods on political engagement, Fair et
al.11 find that Pakistanis in highly flood-a↵ected areas became significantly more politically
engaged than those less exposed. Their evidence suggests that when the government and civil
society response e↵ectively blunts a disaster’s economic impacts, then political engagement
may increase as citizens learn the value of government capacity. Consistent with the proposed
learning mechanism, they find evidence that the increase in turnout was higher in areas with
lower ex ante flood risk.
Sinclair, Hall, and Alvarez,12 on the other hand, argue that Hurricane Katrina had
an average negative impact on turnout, based on combining flood-depth information with
voting records data for mayoral elections in New Orleans. On closer inspection, however,
they found that the relationship is u-shaped: while light to moderate flood exposure reduced
electoral participation, more severely a↵ected areas had an increase in turnout. Referring to
two competing mechanisms, they argue that the Katrina floods potentially both increased
the costs of voting due to economic hardship and at the same time increased salience among
the most severely a↵ected citizens, as flood reconstruction plans were a key issue in the
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mayoral race. Hence, while the costs of voting outweighed the potential benefits among less
a↵ected voters, the potential benefits seemed to have been significantly higher than voting
costs for the most severely a↵ected.
Again others, find no significant impact of natural disasters on turnout. Bodet, Thomas,
and Tessier,13 for example, study the 2013 floods in Calgary and found that turnout did not
change in flood-a↵ected compared to non-a↵ected polling subdivisions. Similarly, Remmer14
notes that in her comparative study on incumbent re-election prospects and exogenous shocks
in Caribbean countries 1970-2009 natural disasters do not seem to a↵ect electoral turnout.
Finally, in closely related research, Chen15 looks beyond natural disasters per se to the
e↵ects of post-disaster government relief on turnout. Using individual level data on the
Federal Emergency Management Agency’s hurricane disaster aid awards in 2004 Florida,
linked with voter turnout records from the 2002 (pre-hurricane) gubernatorial elections and
the 2004 (post-hurricane) presidential elections, Chen finds that government delivery of dis-
tributive aid increases turnout among incumbent party supporters, but decreases opposition
party voter turnout. While not looking at the impact of natural disaster exposure on turnout
directly, he reports in additional tests that disaster a↵ectedness (conditional on not receiving
relief aid before the election) is related negatively (though substantially small and statisti-
cally insignificant) to turnout.
The diversity of empirical results suggests that competing mechanisms link the occurrence
of natural disasters and political participation. In the following, we first draw on the Riker
and Ordeshook16 framework to contextualise the empirical literature so far, highlighting how
natural disasters a↵ect turnout through changing the benefit derived from the election results,
the costs of voting and the sense of civic duty. We then provide empirical evidence from
the Elbe floods in Saxony 2002 and the 2013 Danube floods in Bavaria, two economically,
socially, and politically very di↵erent contexts within Germany, suggesting that the floods
had a consistent negative e↵ect on turnout. This paper thereby empirically contributes to
the evidence base necessary for future research to systematically investigate the conditioning
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factors a↵ecting the impact of natural disasters on political participation.
NATURAL DISASTERS AND THE CALCULUS OF VOTING
We use the Riker and Ordeshook17 model to analyse the turnout e↵ect of natural disasters.
Extending the classic rational choice framework,18 the Riker-Ordeshook model conceptualises
the turnout decision as a cost-benefit calculus of the form
R = pB +D   C,
where R is the expected benefit from turning out, which depends on the benefit derived from
the election result (B), multiplied by the probability of casting a decisive vote (p) (i.e., either
creating or breaking a tie), the benefit derived engaging in the process (i.e., an inherent taste
for voting) or fulfilling a civic duty (D), and finally the costs of participation (C) (i.e., the
time and resources necessary to make an informed choice and cast a ballot).19 Hence, the
greater the benefit derived from the election result or engaging in the process, the greater
the probability of casting a deciding vote, and the lower the costs of voting, the greater the
individual turnout propensity should be. Theoretically, natural disasters may a↵ect B, C,
and D. Below we discuss their potential impact on each term separately.
The benefits derived from an election result (B) depend largely on the di↵erence in
ideological positions of the candidates or parties. Natural disasters might a↵ect issue salience
and thereby highlight key di↵erences for voters between contenders. For example, natural
disasters could highlight di↵erences in recovery and disaster prevention policy, which will
make the outcome of the election more consequential for natural disaster victims, which
should increase their turnout. However, because the probability of casting a decisive ballot
is virtually zero in large elections, any di↵erential changes in B between victims and non-
victims should have no measurable e↵ect on turnout.20
Because the probability of casting a decisive ballot is near zero and therefore any benefit
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derived from the election result is extremely low, even small increases in costs (C) can lead
to considerable drops in turnout.21 Hence, as natural disasters increase the individual costs
associated with learning about candidates and parties and most importantly voting per se, we
should expect aggregate turnout in areas a↵ected by natural disasters to be lower, especially
in those places that were most severely hit.22
Natural disasters might also a↵ect the D term through inspiring pro-social behavior and
the formation of social capital. An extensive psychology literature argues that in the after-
math of natural disasters pro-social attitudes and behaviour tend to dominate.23 Rodriguez,
Trainor, and Quarantelli,24 for example, conducted extensive field research in the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005 and found that instances of pro-social behaviour
greatly outnumbered instances of anti-social behaviour. If voting is driven in part by con-
cerns about the welfare of other citizens,25 such a change in attitudes would be expected to
increase turnout. Natural disasters also appear to be positively correlated with some indi-
cators of social capital due to the spontaneous formation of self-help organizations in their
aftermath.26 These civic associations help train citizens in basic functions of self-governance
as well as reveal the positive outputs from collective action, both features that, according to
the social capital literature, should be positively correlated with political engagement.27
Hence, whether a natural disaster increases or decreases turnout will therefore depend
on the relative size of the increase in C and D. If the increased sense of duty outweighs the
increased cost of voting, then turnout will increase; if the costs of voting increase more than
the sense of duty, then turnout will decrease; and if the change is roughly equal in size, then
there should be no di↵erential turnout e↵ect.28
THE 2002 AND 2013 FLOODS IN GERMANY
In the remainder of this article, we investigate this theoretical puzzle in the German context
for two di↵erent floods in two distinct states: for the 2002 floods we look at Saxony, a
relatively poor area of Germany hit particularly hard and at the time still in a catch-up
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process after the economic decline in post-Cold-War Eastern Germany; with regard to the
2013 floods we look at the state of Bavaria, a relatively wealthy German state experiencing
the most devastating disaster in the state’s recent history. Together we believe these two
German states and floods cover a broad range of contexts to analyse the e↵ects of natural
disasters on turnout in a developed democratic environment. Both floods are with respect to
timing unique as they hit close to general elections and were of a similar overall magnitude:
the Elbe floods in August 2002 (6 August 2002 to 12 September 2002) were followed by
federal elections on 22 September 2002; the Danube floods occurred in June 2013 (18 May
2013 to 4 July 2013) with state elections in Bavaria on 15 September 2013 and federal
elections following on 22 September 2013.29
Both times concentrated heavy rainfall caused severe flooding in Central Europe, breaking
multiple records such as an all-time high along the Elbe in the city of Dresden (7.40m in 2002
above normal) and along the Danube in the city of Passau (7.72m in 2013 above normal –
a 500 year high). The record rainfalls in the upstream catchment areas of Elbe and Danube
resulted in simultaneous flood peaks of Elbe, Danube and their tributaries with record water
levels and subsequent breakages of dikes even further downstream in the lowlands of Northern
Germany (Elbe) and Austria and Hungary (Danube). Both the 2002 and 2013 floods caused
casualties (21 in 2002 and 8 in 2013 in Germany alone) and tens of thousands of people
needed to be evacuated (30,000 in 2002 and 85,000 in 2013 in Germany alone). Both floods
were classified as, depending on the location, 20 year to above 500 year flood events.30
The floods caused billions of Euros worth of damage (approximately e9 billion in 2002 and
approximately e8 billion in 2013) in Germany, but considerable heterogeneity exists between
the damage su↵ered by individual districts both within and between the events. The federal
state of Saxony for example experienced damage amounting to about e6.1 billion in 2002 (8
of 13 districts severely a↵ected). In the federal state of Bavaria damage amounted to e1.3
billion in 2013 (19 of 96 districts a↵ected).
Figures 1 and 2 show the maximal flood extents for Saxony in 2002 and Bavaria in 2013
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and the communities a↵ected. Blue is the maximal flood extent and highlighted in grey are
the communities a↵ected by the floods.
INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE
The response of the federal and state governments was swift and massive. Over 200,000
man-service-days of federal forces (270,000 in 2002 and 215,000 in 2013) were employed to
stabilize dikes and aid in evacuations31 and the federal government and the state governments
agreed in both cases to each bear 50per cent of the relief and reconstruction costs.32 A
considerable part of this aid was given very quickly, without much red tape, and directly to
all a↵ected households that applied, following federal and state level regulations.33
Germany being a federal state, the political management of such events lies jointly in
the hand of federal, state and district level politicians and administrators. While finan-
cial contributions were decided at the federal and state level (excluding damage to federal
property), implementation of the flood loss compensation programs is controlled by district
o cials. In terms of civil society, anecdotal evidence suggests that the floods sparked a large
extent of grass-root mobilization among citizens who volunteered filling sand bags, o↵ering
shelter, and providing relief goods. Especially in 2013, qualitative research indicates that
additional to government steered flood relief social media networks were used by citizens to
self-organize help, with information flows uncoordinated by government agencies.34
Finally, both floods disrupted ongoing campaigns for federal and state elections. The 2002
federal election campaign was characterized by a weak incumbent, with polls indicating a
clear victory for the opposition candidate, the governor of Bavaria.35 The surprise win of
the SPD with incumbent Chancellor Schroeder, coming out with a plus in PR votes of only
6,000 and a five seat majority for his SPD-Greens coalition, was consequently linked to
the exogenous shock of the 2002 floods and the robust response of the then SPD federal
government.36 In line with this argument, the 2002 flood played a major role in the media
coverage of the 2002 electoral campaigns, especially of SPD and Greens.37 In contrast, the
2013 federal election was dominated by a strong CDU incumbent, Chancellor Merkel, who
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had lead the German economy through the Euro crisis.38 Similarly, the 2013 state election in
Bavaria was characterized by a strong CSU incumbent, Governor Seehofer, aiming to regain
the parliamentary majority for the CSU, which has been dominating Bavarian politics for
decades; campaigning was very much influenced by federal election topics.39 Crucial for our
analysis here, we could not find any specific campaign issues in both Bavaria or Saxony that
correlate with flood exposure and might therefore confound our flood estimates.40
DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN
We use aggregate electoral data on community level – the lowest level of analysis at which
turnout changes are traceable and thus the most detailed information that is publicly avail-
able. All data sources are listed and referenced in the Data Section of the Online Appendix.
For our main Tables 1-3 on the 2009-2013 Bavarian federal elections, the 2008-2013
Bavarian state elections, and the 1998-2002 Saxony federal elections our outcome measure
(turnout in per cent) and control variables come from the statistical o ces of Bavaria and
Saxony, respectively.
We select a wide range of control variables following economic voting theory. These
include logged population, logged brute community income, logged brute tax income (Saxony
only, as it is not available for Bavaria 2013), the proportion of elderly (i.e., age>65) and
youth citizens (i.e., age<18), and the employment rate (Bavaria only, as it is not available
for Saxony 2002). Summary statistics for these variables are reported in Appendix Table A8.
We can analyse the 2002 Elbe flood in Saxony and the 2013 Danube flood in Bavaria, as
there are particularly good geo-coded flood layers for these events.41 For Saxony 2002, we
obtained the flood layer from the Saxonian State Agency for Environment, Agriculture and
Geology. The layer represents the maximal flood extent along all rivers and is displayed in
Figure 1. Roughly 54 per cent of all communities in Saxony experienced some flooding and
among flooded communities exposure ranged from 0.008% to 37.65% of a community’s area,
with median and mean exposure at 1.68 per cent and 4.12 per cent, respectively. For the
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Bavarian floods in 2013, we obtained a flood layer from Vista Remote Sensing in Geosciences
GmbH. Vista aggregated layers from several satellite pictures that captured the flood extent
at the time of the flood tide. Overall, 7.9 per cent of all Bavarian communities were a↵ected
and among those exposure ranges from 0.0001% to 55% of a community’s area, with median
and mean flood exposure at 0.22 per cent and 2.10 per cent, respectively.
We estimate e↵ects for di↵erent flood indicators, all of which are derived from the percent
of a community’s area flooded. Our first indicator is based on the dichotomization of the
continuous flood exposure measure, which will enable us to estimate the average treatment
e↵ect on the treated (ATT) from a comparison of a↵ected and una↵ected communities. As
this average might conceal di↵erences between severely and less severely a↵ected communities
we additionally estimate separate e↵ects for less and more a↵ected communities as indicated
by flood extent. For this, we di↵erentiate communities by exposure quartile, i.e. with a
flooded area within the first, second, third and fourth quartile of the exposure distribution
among the flood a↵ected communities.
Cuto↵s for Saxony are at 0.72 per cent (first quartile), 1.68 per cent (median), and 4.25
per cent (third quartile) of the community area flooded. In the case of Bavaria they are
at 0.06 per cent (first quartile), 0.22 per cent (median), and 1.3 per cent of community
area flooded (third quartile). Overall, those indicators allow us to compare severely and
lightly a↵ected communities to non-flooded communities directly and to assess potential
non-monotonicities of flood impacts on turnout.
To estimate flood treatment e↵ects42 we need estimates for the counterfactual outcome
of the n1 flooded (F = 1) communities absent the flood (potential outcome Y 0i |F = 1 for
a↵ected communities i = 1, ...n1). For this we use a di↵erence-in-di↵erences design, allowing
us to control for any time-invariant unobserved confounders in treatment and control obser-
vations by relating treatment to changes in outcome variables. Of course, time-variant bias
in treatment and control observations can only insofar be controlled for as it is observable.43
In terms of the Rubin Causal Framework44, our analysis relies on the central assumption
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that common trends in the treated (i = 1, ...n1) and control observations (i = n1 + 1, ...n)
are present over the electoral period we observe (from t  1 to t). We therefore assume that
E(Y 0i,t   Y 0i,t 1|F = 1) = E(Y 0i,t   Y 0i,t 1|F = 0).
We assess whether the central assumption of no e↵ect in the pre-treatment population
holds.45 Our placebo estimates indicated that pre-flood trends were not perfectly parallel (see
Placebo Test section and Table A1 in the Online Appendix), so we pre-processed our data
via entropy weighting46 to generate a control group that perfectly matches the distribution
of pre-treatment outcome and control variables. Entropy weighting is a data pre-processing
technique that directly generates balanced samples given a binary treatment indicator. The
aim is to find a set of weights such that the distribution of treatment group characteristics
in pre-specified moments is perfectly matched by the re-weighted control group. Compared
to matching, entropy weighting has several advantages.47 First, it provides a higher degree
of covariate balance, in our case for the first, second, and third moments of the covariate
distributions. This is a valuable property, as we no longer need to check for covariate
balance, as the pre-treatment outcome and control variables in both groups show identical
distributions by construction, resulting in placebo estimates of precise zeros. Second, entropy
weighting retains valuable information in the preprocessed data by allowing the unit weights
to vary smoothly across units, achieving balance while keeping them as close to one as
possible. Finally, the method is computationally attractive since the optimization problem
to find the unit weights is well behaved and globally convex. Hence, if no time-varying
confounders that both a↵ect treatment status and pre-treatment outcomes have been left
out of the calculation of these weights, our comparison between treatment and control groups
will produce unbiased estimates of the ATT.
Our ATT is therefore equal to the di↵erence in (entropy weighted) trends between flooded
and non-flooded communities :
ATT = E(Y 1i,t   Y 0i,t 1|F = 1)  E(wi(Y 0i,t   Y 0i,t 1)|F = 0).
We estimate e↵ects with an (entropy weighted) fixed-e↵ects estimator including year (↵t)
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and unit fixed ( i) e↵ects. This estimator will give us the ATT ( ) we are interested in via
the estimation of
Yit =  Fit +Xit  + ↵t +  i + ✏it (1)
A vector X of time-variant controls is included to take potential di↵erences in time
trends into account. For Bavaria, where a large part of the state was not treated, we restrict
our control group to the south-eastern areas of the state (see highlighted area in Figure
2), as we expect the distribution of potential unobservable time-varying confounders to be
better balanced between treatment and control group the geographically closer treatment
and control groups are.48
RESULTS
This section presents our findings. We first discuss the average Elbe 2002 and Danube 2013
flood impact on turnout for the treated communities of Bavaria (federal and state elections)
and Saxony (federal elections). We report an, on average, moderate negative treatment
e↵ect. Turnout in a↵ected communities declined by approximately half a percentage point.
Thereafter, we present disaggregated treatment e↵ects to find out about heterogeneity in the
treatment e↵ect. Finally, we assess the robustness of our results, especially to violations of
SUTVA - we do not find that spill-overs are likely to bias our results.
Main Results
Table 1 presents our ATT estimates under the (weighted) common trend assumption. Col-
umn 1 reports results for the 2002 Elbe flood and Saxonian federal election turnout, Column 2
for the Bavarian federal election, and Column 3 for the Bavarian state election turnout after
the 2013 Danube flood.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
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Our estimates suggest that both the 2002 and the 2013 floods have a consistently negative
e↵ect on turnout that is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. The negative e↵ect
ranges between 0.36 for the Bavarian federal elections, 0.52 for the Bavarian state elections
and 0.65 percentage points for the Saxonian federal elections. While small in absolute term,
the flood e↵ect for Saxony amounts to 9 per cent, for the federal elections in Bavaria to 39
per cent, and for the Bavarian state election to 8 per cent of the counterfactual year e↵ect
in treatment communities. Hence, in relative terms the flood e↵ect on changes in turnout is
moderate to large.
Note that the negative turnout e↵ect is slightly (although not statistically significantly)
larger for Saxony (Column 1), where floods and elections were temporally closer to each other.
Moreover, note that the negative turnout e↵ects are substantially larger for the state elections
in Bavaria (Column 3) compared to the federal elections (Column 2). Both elections were
only one week apart, with state elections preceding federal elections (15 and 22 September),
three months after the flood. This suggests that although people in flooded communities had
a lower propensity to turn out on average in both elections, their lower turnout propensity
was especially pronounced in state elections. While the di↵erence in e↵ects is not statistically
significant, this makes intuitive sense, as state elections in Germany are generally seen as
‘second order’ compared to federal elections and the benefits of voting are thus potentially
lower.49 An increase in voting costs should thus push more citizens below their participation
threshold. A competing salience mechanism as referenced by Sinclair, Hall, and Alvarez,50
as flood prevention measures are upon state authorities to plan and implement, which could
have resulted in a counteracting positive turnout e↵ect, is not supported by this data.
Finally, the small absolute average change in turnout in the federal elections in Saxony is
in line with Bechtel and Hainmueller’s51 conclusion that the 2002 flood increased SPD vote
share primarily through persuasion rather than mobilization.
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Treatment E↵ect Heterogeneity
To assess the heterogeneity of the flood e↵ect, we disaggregate our binary treatment indicator
into the quartiles of the distribution of ‘severity’ of flood a↵ectedness. For each of these
treated quartiles, we construct a perfectly balanced control group by entropy weighting and
estimate the ATT.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
There are two main results. First, as can be seen in Column 4 across all Panels of Table 2,
our results indicate that the fourth quartile, those most heavily a↵ected, are consistently
less likely to turn out. This e↵ect is most clearly visible for the federal election results in
Bavaria: the more a↵ected a community was, the lower its participation in the election. The
fourth quartile shows a highly significant negative e↵ect of -0.66 percentage points.52 For
the federal elections in Saxony and the state elections in Bavaria, the fourth quartile shows
clear negative e↵ects (Saxony: -0.69, significant at the 10% level; Bavaria: -0.56, significant
at the 5% level), though non-linearities seem to be present.
Second and as indicated above, the average aggregate turnout response among those
communities least flooded in part even surpasses the most heavily a↵ected places. Given the
prediction of the ‘costs of voting’-mechanism, it is a surprise that the first quartile e↵ect for
the Saxonian federal elections (-1.08 percentage points, significant at the 5% level) and the
second quartile in Bavarian state elections (-0.86 percentage points, significant at the 5%
level) show such a strong negative response. Although the estimated coe cients are all not
statistically di↵erent from each other, this indicates that competing mechanisms might be
at work.
There are at least two potential explanations for this finding. Interpreting these results
through the lens of Fair et al.,53 they are consistent with a ‘surprise’ e↵ect. The degree of
flood exposure most likely correlates with ex ante risk of being flooded: those communities
more severely a↵ected are likely to be those regularly flooded due to their geographic loca-
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tion. Hence, among the least a↵ected the proportion of communities that are hit only in
extraordinary floods is likely to be greater. They were least prepared and the floods therefore
had the greatest impact on turnout in those communities.
Alternatively, the findings might be an artefact of our measurement, share of the com-
munity area flooded, which is a noisy indicator of how traumatic the floods were for a
community. The first quartile most likely contains just as many barely a↵ected places as
communities that got lucky and just escaped a catastrophe. Satellites would capture almost
no flooding in places where the river is channelled, water levels were dangerously high but no
dykes broke, but large-scale evacuations might have taken place in many such communities.
This certainly has the potential to translate into large political e↵ects as well, although the
flood layer would not show much flooding.
Robustness
We are especially worried about spill-overs, e.g. via media-coverage, personal experience
or ties with the flood region, which would violate the SUTVA assumption. We would be
especially concerned if spill-overs were positive while our main e↵ect is negative. Then, our
results would merely provide an upper bound of the true e↵ect. We are unable to assess the
global e↵ects of spill-overs; but there is good reason to expect regional heterogeneity and
hence stronger spill-overs the closer a community is to a↵ected rivers, which is testable. We
therefore coded communities directly bordering our flood layer, but not situated along the
a↵ected rivers, separately. Table 3 reports results.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
In Columns 1, 4 and 7 we estimate the ATT excluding communities that neighbour flood
a↵ected places. The estimates remain consistently negative and statistically significant. If
anything, our results get slightly stronger. Columns 3, 6 and 9 confirm this conjecture:
Estimating a (placebo) e↵ect for adjacent communities while excluding actually flooded
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communities, there seems to be a slightly lower turnout trend in communities neighbouring
flood a↵ected places. Finally, Columns 2, 5, and 8 report estimates based on comparing
a↵ected to adjacent non-flooded communities. While the estimates are slightly smaller and
no longer statistically significant, they are consistently negative. All three tests imply that
if there are any spill-overs they are likely to be negative and hence in the direction of the
main e↵ect. We therefore conclude that spill-overs might be present, though we should not
be worried about them econometrically, as they, if anything, lead to an underestimation of
our main e↵ect.
To further assess the robustness of our results, we conducted a series of additional checks.
We summarise our findings below. More details and the respective tables can be found in
Section 2 of the Online Appendix.
First of all, we estimated Models 2 and 3 of Table 1 and Table 2 with unweighted fixed-
e↵ects regressions - our main interpretation is una↵ected by this modelling strategy (see
Tables A2 and A6). We recoded our treatment dummy for Bavaria, as the Bavarian flood
layer relies on satellite data that did not perfectly capture flood extent in the southernmost
communities of the state. Results are unchanged with this definition of treatment (Table A3).
We estimated e↵ects with a continuous flood indicator which similarly leads to consistent
negative e↵ects around 0.3-0.4 percentage points for every 10 percentage points of community
area flooded (see Table A4).
Second, if citizens vote outside their voting district because of flood related dislocations,
this mechanically leads to an increase in turnout in control group communities and to a
decrease in treatment group communities, biasing our estimates. We use urn voting shares
as well as statistics on ‘voting card applications’ necessary for our-of-district-voting to provide
evidence that this is unlikely to be the case: The former should increase relatively in adjacent
communities if dislocated voters were voting there; the latter should relatively increase in
flood-a↵ected communities if dislocated voters were disproportionately not voting there;
neither argument is supported by the data (see Tables A5 and A7). Still, we want to highlight
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that dislocations are of course a source of our main e↵ect, as they should increase voting
costs for a↵ected citizens. E.g. distance to the polling station and transportation costs
are likely increased, which has been shown to be an important determinant of turnout.54
Similarly, dislocations likely increase stress levels, which similarly has been shown to depress
turnout.55
Third, Using the data on postal and urn voting, we can learn even more about how the
floods a↵ected participation patterns, lending additional support to our main conclusions.
Table A7 reports the (cross-sectional) di↵erence in the urn and postal voting share between
flood a↵ected and una↵ected Saxonian communities: urn turnout decreases (by 1.1 percent-
age points), while postal turnout increases (by 0.4 percentage points). This is an indication
that large amounts of Saxonian voters stayed home, due to the disaster, and that postal
voting was used by many flood victims to cast a ballot. For Bavaria, due to the larger tem-
poral distance between flood and election, we would not necessarily expect the same results
on urn and postal voting. As indicated by Table A5, columns 1-3 (federal elections) and 5-7
(state elections), our estimations indicate that both urn voting and postal voting decreased
in flood a↵ected communities.
Finally, disruptions of electoral preparations (and thus a reduction in state capacity)
are an alternative mechanism for the observed negative turnout e↵ect. Based on a search
in national and local newspapers for electoral irregularities and qualitative interviews with
election o cials, we consider it unlikely that the proper execution of the elections was en-
dangered. The e↵ect is therefore likely to be behavioral rather than the result of a physical
inability of flood victims to cast their ballot.
CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes the linkage between natural disasters and political participation for
two large-scale floods in the two German federal states of Saxony and Bavaria in 2002 and
2013. We find a consistent negative, albeit moderate-sized e↵ect of flooding on electoral
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participation, ranging between 0.35 (federal elections in Bavaria) and 0.65 (federal election
in Saxony) percentage points, which accounts for between 8-9 (federal election in Saxony and
state election in Bavaria) and 39 percent (federal election in Bavaria) of the average annual
change in turnout. Estimating the flood impact for each exposure quartile separately, while
it is negative for all quartiles, the e↵ect is particularly strong in those communities a↵ected
worst across all cases and years.
The consistency of the negative e↵ect is remarkable for three reasons. First, we are
dealing with widely varying socio-economic and political contexts within Germany - Saxony
had been democratizing only for a decade before the 2002 floods and was still in an economic
catch-up process; Bavaria is a politically very stable and economically well-developed region
in Germany. Second, while the 2002 floods in Saxony were without precedence in the recent
history of the state, the 2013 floods in Bavaria were the re-occurrence of a natural disaster
termed as ‘one hundred year event’ within a decade. Third, the standing of the incumbent
and electoral campaigns di↵ered widely: while the 2002 campaign was dominated by a
weak incumbent, Gerhard Schro¨der, lagging in the polls until right before the election and
motivating swing-voters especially in the East not least through the flood,56 the 2013 election
saw a strong incumbent, Angela Merkel, with issues besides the flood dominating the nation-
wide electoral campaigns.57
Theoretically, we argue that natural disasters should have an influence on turnout via
increased voting costs (negatively) and increases in interactions among citizens and the sense
of civic duty (positively). Our results suggest that in this context the former outweighed
the latter, especially in those communities most severely hit. This stands in stark contrast
to the findings of Fair et al.58 in a developing country, suggesting that the extent to which
natural disasters a↵ect turnout is context-specific. Future research should aim to uncover
the conditional factors determining the circumstances under which the increase in the costs
of voting outweighs the gains in civic duty. Having individual-level pre-post disaster panel
data will be crucial in performing these analyses.
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While we lack the necessary individual-level data to directly assess the underlying mech-
anism behind the aggregate result, our findings and context-specific factors are inconsistent
with two other proposed mechanisms. While Sinclair, Hall, and Alvarez59 find an overall
negative impact of flood exposure on turnout, they show a reversal of the e↵ect among those
New Orleans residents most severely a↵ected by Hurricane Katrina. They explain this non-
monotonic e↵ect by the increased salience of the mayoral race, which focused on disaster
management and future preparedness, issues of particular importance for those residents
most severely a↵ected. In our cases we find no evidence for an issue salience e↵ect:60 those
communities most severely flooded had consistently lower turnout rates than non-flooded
communities. Moreover, if there was an e↵ect, the most likely place to observe it would
have been at the state elections level in Bavaria, where political responsibility for disaster
prevention lies. Yet, for the Bavarian state elections, the negative turnout e↵ect is even more
pronounced compared to the Bavarian federal elections.
Chen61 argues for a partisan mechanism that motivates pre-flood incumbent supporters
and deters incumbent opponents from turning out. While this could be a potential expla-
nation for the turnout e↵ect in Saxony 2002, where the federal incumbent party received
relatively low support levels in pre-flood state elections, this is unlikely to be the case in
Bavaria 2013: the state and federal incumbent are of the same party family and incumbent
party support is traditionally strong in the flooded areas. Moreover, the argument by Chen
is most likely moderated in multi-party systems, where post-electoral coalition dynamics
make vote choice decisions more complicated.
With respect to policy implications, both theoretically and empirically our results high-
light that it is important to take steps to reduce the costs of voting in a post-disaster en-
vironment, e.g. by increased administrative flexibility concerning electoral registration and
application processes for postal voting.62 For Saxony, where the temporal distance between
flood and election was especially short, we find evidence that postal voting was used at a
disproportionally higher rate in a↵ected districts, although not to an extent that would have
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made up for the overall negative turnout e↵ect.
Finally, and more broadly, a negative aggregate turnout e↵ect of natural disasters could
have a consequential e↵ect on disaster prevention policy, especially in proportional electoral
systems. Over time, and in particular if disaster frequencies in a certain region increase, the
small turnout e↵ects of any individual disaster can build up to sizeable e↵ects due to habit
formation (i.e., voters (especially first-time voters) that do not participate in elections are
less likely to participate in future elections).63 When turnout decreases in regions exposed to
natural disasters, the electorate shifts towards constituents for which the salience of disaster
prevention might be lower, with consequences for the electoral platforms o↵ered by parties.
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA AND RESEARCH MATERIALS
The supplemental Online Appendix for this article can be accessed on the Taylor & Francis
website, doi... The replication files for the analysis in this paper and the Online Appendix
can be accessed at the Harvard Dataverse under doi:10.7910/DVN/X3VUSW.
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FIGURES
Figure 1: 2002 FLOOD EXTENT IN SAXONY
Note: The figure shows the 2002 community boundaries and 2002 flood extent in Saxony. The Elbe and
Mulde, the main river systems in Saxony, are shown in dark blue and the maximal flood extent in blue.
A↵ected communities are highlighted in grey. Robustness checks draw on adjacent communities shown in
dark grey. The flood layer is provided by the Saxonian State Agency for Environment, Agriculture and
Geology. Community shapefiles stem from the German Federal Agency for Geo-Information and Geodesy.
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Figure 2: 2013 FLOOD EXTENT IN BAVARIA
Note: The figure shows community boundaries and 2013 flood extent in Bavaria. The flood region where
treatment e↵ects are estimated is highlighted. The main rivers of the Danube river system in Bavaria are
shown in dark blue, flood extent as measured by satellite data in blue. A↵ected communities are highlighted
in grey. Robustness checks draw on additional potentially a↵ected communities (light grey) and adjacent
communities (dark grey). The flood layer is kindly provided by Vista Remote Sensing in Geosciences GmbH.
Community shapefiles stem from the German Federal Agency for Geo-Information and Geodesy.
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TABLES
TABLE 1: 1998-2002 FEDERAL ELECTION (FE) TURNOUT TREND IN SAXONY
FOR THE 2002 ELBE FLOOD AND 2008/9-2013 FEDERAL/STATE ELECTION (SE)





















Year 2013 -0.93 6.25⇤⇤⇤
(0.74) (0.73)
Control Variables included included included
R-squared 0.94 0.16 0.87
Observations 860 1968 1968
Clusters 430 984 984
Note: The unit of analysis is a community, the fourth and smallest administrative unit. The fixed-
e↵ects regressions are estimated in 2014 community boundaries with entropy weights from 1998 placebo
level regressions (Saxony), 2005-2009 (Bavaria FEs) and 2003-2008 (Bavaria SEs) placebo fixed e↵ect
regressions. Model 1 is estimated for Saxonian communities, models 2 and 3 for communities in
the three south-eastern Bavarian regions with floods occurring in 2013. Community level clustered
standard errors are shown in brackets. The estimated constant is not shown. Regressions include the
following controls: logged population, logged brute income (Saxony only), logged brute tax income,
employment rate (Bavaria only), proportion of elderly citizens (i.e., age>65), and the proportion of
youth (i.e. aged<18). Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***).
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TABLE 2: ESTIMATION OF TURNOUT TRENDS PER QUARTILE OF FLOODED
COMMUNITY AREA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Saxonian Federal Elections 1998-2002
Area Flooded  25p -1.08⇤⇤
(0.53)
25p < Area Flooded  50p -0.35
(0.33)
50p < Area Flooded  75p -0.83⇤⇤
(0.35)
Area Flooded > 75p -0.69⇤
(0.39)
Year 2002 -8.19⇤⇤⇤ -7.74⇤⇤⇤ -7.43⇤⇤⇤ -7.41⇤⇤⇤
(1.01) (0.63) (0.68) (0.59)
Observations 512 510 510 510
Panel B: Bavarian Federal Elections 2009-2013
Area Flooded  25p 0.03
(0.27)
25p < Area Flooded  50p -0.10
(0.27)
50p < Area Flooded  75p -0.38
(0.44)
Area Flooded > 75p -0.66⇤⇤⇤
(0.19)
Year 2013 0.24 -2.62⇤ 0.03 -1.10⇤
(0.69) (1.40) (1.13) (0.56)
Observations 1728 1728 1728 1728
Panel C: Bavarian State Elections 2008-2013
Area Flooded  25p -0.28
(0.38)
25p < Area Flooded  50p -0.86⇤⇤
(0.34)
50p < Area Flooded  75p -0.36
(0.41)
Area Flooded > 75p -0.56⇤⇤
(0.28)
Year 2013 6.33⇤⇤⇤ 5.54⇤⇤⇤ 6.31⇤⇤⇤ 6.45⇤⇤⇤
(0.89) (1.36) (1.41) (0.79)
Observations 1728 1728 1728 1728
Note: The unit of analysis is a community, the fourth and smallest administrative
unit. The fixed-e↵ects regressions are estimated in 2014 community boundaries
with entropy weights from 1998 placebo level regressions (Saxony), 2005-2009
(Bavaria Federal Elections) and 2003-2008 (Bavaria State Elections) placebo
fixed e↵ect regressions. Panel A is estimated for Saxonian communities, panels B
and C for communities in the three south-eastern Bavarian regions with floods
occurring in 2013. Community level clustered standard errors are shown in
brackets. Constant and controls are not shown. Regressions include the following
controls: logged population, logged brute income (Saxony only), logged brute
tax income, employment rate (Bavaria only), proportion of elderly (i.e., age>65),
proportion of youth (i.e. age<18). Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01)
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1 PLACEBO TESTS
Our estimation strategy for the Saxony federal election period 1998-2002, the Bavaria federal
election period 2009-2013 and the Bavaria state election period 2008-2013 relies on the
common trend assumption, which we assess with placebos from three pre-treatment periods.
In Saxony, the placebo estimation reveals that the parallel trend assumption might be
violated (see Column 1 in Appendix Table A1). Analyzing the 1994-1998 turnout trend
in Saxony, we find a positive and statistically significant placebo e↵ect of 0.53 percentage
points. We therefore rely on entropy weighting to ensure parallel trends. The large number
of community boundary changes in 2002 and missing turnout information for absentee voters
in 1994 prevents us from estimating pre-treatment trends in 2002 community boundaries.
We therefore generate entropy weights based on the distribution of the 1998 treatment and
control variable levels under the 2002 community boundaries.
In contrast to Saxony, the placebo analyses reveal that the assumption of a parallel
trend is likely justified in Bavaria. Analyzing the 1994-1998 federal election turnout trend
in Bavaria, the placebo e↵ect of 0.09 percentage points is both substantially small and
statistically insignificant. There is a caveat here, though: we were forced to choose the 1994-
1998 period for the placebo test, as Bavaria experienced some flooding in 2002 and 2005
before elections which could directly or via temporal spill-overs (Bechtel and Hainmueller,
2011) be related to both turnout and our treatment indicator in placebo analyses in the
immediate pre-treatment period. We nevertheless assess the parallel trend for the 2003-
2008 state election and the 2005-2009 federal election periods. These tests reveal a negative
pre-treatment e↵ect (-0.80 percentage points, significant at the 5% level) for the 2005-2009
federal elections and a positive pre-treatment e↵ect (0.61 percentage points, significant at the
5% level) for the 2003-2008 state elections. To add additional robustness to our inference, we
therefore construct entropy weights in these periods such that treatment and control units
are perfectly balanced on the first, second and third moments1 of the pre-treatment and
control variable distributions. Qualitatively the results of our fixed e↵ects regressions with
these weights are consistent with results using the unweighted control group.
1For Bavaria, the treatment subgroups ‘second quartile a↵ected’ (state election data) and ‘second and
third quartile a↵ected’ (federal election data) could only be balanced on the 2nd moment.
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Table A1: Placebo Regressions on Pre-Treatment Turnout Trends (Federal Elections (FE) in
Saxony and Federal and State Elections (SE) in Bavaria) for the 2002 Elbe Flood (Saxony)
and the 2013 Danube Flood (Bavaria)




















Flood Indicator 0.53** 0.09 -0.80⇤⇤⇤ 0.61⇤⇤
(0.25) (0.17) (0.17) (0.25)






Control Variables no no yes yes
R-squared 0.890 0.674 0.896 0.134
Observations 1348 1938 1968 1968
Clusters 674 969 984 984
The unit of analysis is a community, the fourth and smallest administrative unit. Model 1
is estimated for Saxonian communities, models 2-4 on communities in the three south-eastern
Bavarian regions with floods occurring in 2013. Models 1 and 2 are estimated in 1998 community
boundaries, models 3 and 4 in 2014 community boundaries. Dependent variable is community
level aggregate turnout, in model 1-2 community level aggregate turnout excluding absentee
voters. All models are fixed e↵ects regressions. The estimated constant is not shown. Models
3-4 include the following controls: logged population, p.c. community brute income, proportion
of elderly citizens (i.e., age>65), proportion of employed, and the proportion of youth citizens
(i.e., age<18)). Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***).
Columns report robust community level clustered standard errors in brackets.
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2 ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS TESTS
To further assess the robustness of our results, we conducted a series of additional checks.
Given the indication of parallel trends through the 1994-1998 placebo, we estimated
Models 2 and 3 of Table 1 and Table 2 for Bavaria with unweighted fixed-e↵ects regressions -
our main interpretation is una↵ected by this modeling strategy (see Table A2). Additionally,
as the Bavarian flood layer relies on satellite data that did not perfectly capture flood extent
in the southernmost communities of the state, we re-estimated Models 2 and 3 of Table 1
but recoded the treatment dummy to include all communities that border an a↵ected river
within districts where disaster alarm was called. Results are unchanged with this definition
of treatment (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Finally, for Bavaria, as placebo regressions
give some justification for unweighted fixed-e↵ects regressions, we estimating e↵ects with a
continuous flood indicator, which similarly leads to consistent negative e↵ects around 0.3-0.4
percentage points for every 10 percentage points of community area flooded (see Table A4).
Continuous e↵ects have to be estimated with unweighted fixed-e↵ects regressions as entropy
weights cannot be calculated for continuous treatments (Hainmueller, 2012).
Given the community boundary changes in Saxony that required us calculate entropy
weights on 1998 levels rather than 1994-1998 trends, we re-estimated the fixed e↵ects regres-
sions on trends (1998-2002) reported in Tables 1 and 2 without entropy weights. Moreover,
we also ran a level regression for Saxony in 2002 controlling for past turnout in federal elec-
tions in 1998. The results are reported in Appendix Table A6 and are qualitatively similar
to the weighted results reported in the main paper.
An additional concern relates to the voting of displaced persons: If citizens vote outside
their voting district (because of flood related dislocations), this mechanically leads to an in-
crease in turnout in una↵ected (control group) communities and to a decrease in treatment
group communities, which might explain our negative ATT estimates. Appendix Tables A5
and A7 provide evidence that this is unlikely to be the case. If displaced persons indeed
voted outside their communities, we would expect this to occur predominately in neighbour-
ing communities, which should result in more urn voting. For Bavaria, where we were able
to gather data on community level urn voting and postal voting, urn voting turnout in com-
munities neighbouring flooded communities is lower or equal (Appendix Table A5, column
4 and 8). For Saxony, Appendix Table A7, column 5, reports e↵ects for an even better mea-
sure: we can assess the (cross-sectional) share of voters that voted with a ‘voting card’ that
is required for out of district voting at the ballot box. Comparing Saxonian communities
una↵ected and those bordering a↵ected communities, there is no evidence for an increase in
‘out of district voting’. Overall, this leads us to conclude that flood displacement did not
mechanically confound our estimates. Of course, nonetheless physical dislocation might have
induced stress and/or increased voting costs to an extent that explains our treatment e↵ect.
Using the data on postal and urn voting, we can learn even more about how the floods
a↵ected participation patterns, lending additional support to our main conclusions. Ap-
pendix Table A7 reports the (cross-sectional) di↵erence in the urn and postal voting share
between flood a↵ected and una↵ected Saxonian communities: urn turnout decreases (by 1.1
percentage points), while postal turnout increases (by 0.4 percentage points). The share of
postal voters increases by 0.7 percentage points (Model 4). This is an indication that large
amounts of Saxonian voters stayed home, due to the disaster, and that postal voting was
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used by many flood victims to cast a ballot. For Bavaria, due to the larger temporal distance
between flood and election, we would not necessarily expect the same results on urn and
postal voting. As indicated by Appendix Table A5, columns 1-3 (federal elections) and 5-7
(state elections), our estimations indicate that both urn voting and postal voting decreased
in flood a↵ected communities.
Finally, disruptions of electoral preparations are a potential source of our turnout e↵ect.
Were this the case, a reduction in turnout would not be due to the disaster influencing
individual citizen behaviour but due to a reduction in state capacity to conduct orderly
elections. We consider this unlikely. An extensive search of national and local newspapers
found no reports of public discussions of electoral irregularities due to the floods. The last
disaster alarms ended both in 2002 and in 2013 before the general elections,2 election o cers
had enough time preparing polling stations. Qualitative interviews with election o cials
support our conclusion.3 Only in one case, an interview with an election o cer from one of
the most severely a↵ected districts in Saxony 2002, it was reported that the physical process
of voting was in few precincts of the districts adversely a↵ected.4 On the other hand, in 2013
the time between disaster and election was su ciently large, so that physical obstruction has
not been an issue. Therefore, we deem it unlikely that the proper execution of the elections
was responsible for the e↵ects we observe. The observed negative e↵ect is therefore likely
to be behavioral rather than the result of a physical inability of flood victims to cast their
ballot.
2This was in 2002 in a small part of the district Sa¨chsische Schweiz on September 21st, 2002 (MDR, 2013)
and in 2013 in the district Deggendorf in Bavaria on June 22nd, 2013 (PNP, 2013).
3Personal communication with Thomas Obst, Election O cer in the district Sa¨chsische Schweiz-
Osterzgebirge, October 13th, 2015, Berenice Ko¨nig, Head of the Elections Division, Statistical O ce of
Saxony, October 7th, 2015, with Hartwig Zorn, Department for Emergency Services and Civil Protection,
Saxonian Ministry of the Interior, August 24th, 2016 and with Peter Hallermaier, Section I D 4, Bavarian
Ministry of the Interior, August 24th, 2016.
4I.e. auxiliary polling stations had to be set up, infrastructure connecting to polling stations was still
disrupted, election-related public bulletins were damaged, it cannot be ruled out that election related mailings
did not reach dislocated citizens. But this concerned, at the time of the election, only small parts of a↵ected
districts. There had been no formal objections voiced.
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2.1 Additional Robustness Tests for Bavaria
Table A2: Unweighted Fixed E↵ects Regressions for the 2013 Danube Flood
(1) (2) (3) (4)




Area Flooded  25p 0.22 -0.40
(0.25) (0.37)
25p < Area Flooded  50p 0.06 -1.09⇤⇤⇤
(0.30) (0.34)
50p < Area Flooded  75p 0.03 -0.40
(0.43) (0.43)
Area Flooded > 75p -0.42⇤⇤ -0.66⇤⇤
(0.20) (0.28)
Year 2013 -1.20⇤⇤⇤ -1.18⇤⇤⇤ 6.06⇤⇤⇤ 6.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.40) (0.41) (0.46) (0.46)
N 1968 1968 1968 1968
Clusters 984 984 984 984
R2 .17 .18 .86 .86
The unit of analysis is a community, the fourth and smallest administrative unit. The sample is
restricted to the south-eastern, flood a↵ected Bavarian districts. The regressions are estimated
in the 2014 community boundaries. All models are fixed e↵ects regressions. The estimated
constant and controls are not shown. All regressions include the following controls: logged
population, p.c. community brute income, proportion of elderly citizens (i.e., age>65), and the
proportion of youth citizens (i.e., age<18)). Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level
are marked with ** (*, ***). Columns report robust community level clustered standard errors
in brackets.
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Table A3: Fixed E↵ects Regressions for the 2013 Danube Flood with Recoded Treatment
Dummy (With Entropy Weights)
(1) (2)
Bavaria FE 2009-2013 Bavaria SE 2008-2013
Outcome: Turnout (%)
Flood treatment -0.41⇤⇤⇤ -0.49⇤⇤⇤
(0.15) (0.18)





The treatment dummy is recoded to include all communities adjacent to a flooded river in
districts with disaster alarm in 2013 additional to the flood layer communities. The unit of
analysis is a community, the fourth and smallest administrative unit. The sample is restricted
to the south-eastern, flood a↵ected Bavarian districts. The regressions are estimated in the 2014
community boundaries. All models are fixed e↵ects regressions. Models use entropy weights from
2003-2008 (SEs)/2005-2009 (FEs) placebo di↵erence-in-di↵erence regressions. The estimated
constant and controls are not shown. All regressions include the following controls: logged
population, p.c. community brute income, proportion of elderly citizens (i.e., age>65), and the
proportion of youth citizens (i.e., age<18)). Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level
are marked with ** (*, ***). Columns report robust community level clustered standard errors
in brackets.
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table A4: Fixed E↵ects Regressions for the 2013 Danube Flood with Continouus Treatment
Indicator (Without Entropy Weights)
(1) (2)
Bavaria SE 2008-2013 Bavaria FE 2009-2013
Outcome: Turnout (%)
Area Flooded -3.28 -4.96⇤⇤⇤
(3.52) (0.99)





The treatment indicator is measured continuously as % of area flooded. The unit of analysis
is a community, the third and smallest administrative unit. The sample is restricted to the
south-eastern, flood a↵ected Bavarian districts. The regressions are estimated in the 2014
community boundaries. All models are fixed e↵ects regressions. All regressions include the
following controls: logged population, p.c. community brute income, proportion of elderly
citizens (i.e., age>65), and the proportion of youth citizens (i.e., age<18)). The constant is
omitted from the output. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with **












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.2 Additional Robustness Tests for Saxony
Table A6: Regressions on the 1998-2002 Federal Election Turnout Trend in Saxonia for
the 2002 Elbe Flood Without Entropy Weights and on the 2002 Federal Election Turnout
Controlling for 1998 Turnout Levels









Flood Indicator -0.67*** -0.67***
(0.22) (0.23)
Area Flooded  25p -0.45
(0.33)
25p < Area Flooded  50p -0.59*
(0.32)
50p < Area Flooded  75p -0.84**
(0.33)
Area Flooded > 75p -0.91***
(0.33)
Year 2002 -7.41*** -7.58*** -7.78*** -7.47*** -7.62***
(0.40) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33)
Turnout 1998 0.85***
(0.05)
Control Variables included included included included included included
R-squared 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.57
Observations 860 686 685 685 685 430
Clusters 430 430 430 430 430
Note: The unit of analysis is a community, the fourth and smallest administrative unit. Columns 1-5 show results of
fixed-e↵ects regression without entropy weights with community clustered standard errors. Column 2 shows results of level
regression without entropy weights controlling for turnout levels in 1998. The estimated constant and controls are not
shown. All regressions include the following controls: logged population, logged brute income, logged brute tax income,
proportion of elderly citizens (i.e., age>65), and the proportion of youth (i.e. aged<18). Estimates significant at the 0.05





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4 ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON CAMPAIGN TOPICS
Figure A1: Perceptions of most important problems in 2002 Saxony and 2013 Bavaria before
the election
Note: The figure shows the distribution of replies to the question ‘What is according to your opinion
currently the most important problem in Germany?’ from Politbarometer survey respondents in August and
pre-election September Saxony (2002, N=844 ) and Bavaria (2013, N=1,252). Only the top 5 plus the flood
category are displayed, the rest is accumulated to the ‘other’ category. Data is publicly available at GESIS
under code ‘ZA3850’ (doi:10.4232/1.3850) for 2002 and code ‘ZA5677’ (doi:10.4232/1.12171) for 2013.
5 SUMMARY OF ALL DATA SOURCES
• Election data:
– For the 2009-2013 Bavarian federal elections, the 2008-2013 Bavarian state elec-
tions, and the 1998-2002 Saxony federal elections our outcome measure (turnout





– Data for 1994-1998 Bavaria placebo estimates come from the Federal Elections Ad-
ministrator of Germany.7 We obtained data for 1994 and 1998 on sub-community
level (polling stations). This data we aggregated to community level and, for
Bavaria, connected over time with data from Destatis on community boundaries
and changes therein. This was possible, as we, with few exceptions, only observe
communities remaining identical or are merging in the period at hand. As in the
1990s absentee voters have only been recorded at the district level, our outcome
measure for the 1994-1998 community level trend is turnout excluding absentee
voters.
– Data for 2002 urn and postal voting in Saxony was calculated from Federal Elec-
tions Administrator’s polling station data. As postal voting is only reported as
aggregate for many communities and/or polling stations, we had to use voters
with voting card applications (which are a prerequisite for the postal vote) as
proxy for postal voting.
– Data for 2008/9-13 urn and postal voting was provided on request from the Sta-
tistical O ce of Bavaria.8
• Flood treatment data:
– For Saxony 2002, we obtained the flood layer from the Saxonian State Agency
for Environment, Agriculture and Geology, publicly available at http://www.
umwelt.sachsen.de/umwelt/wasser/8838.htm.9
– For the Bavarian floods in 2013, we obtained a flood layer from the company
Vista Remote Sensing in Geosciences GmbH. Vista aggregated layers from several
satellite pictures that captured the flood extent at the time of the flood tide.10
– Community level shapefiles (administrative areas VG250) for di↵erent years to
match flood extent and community turnout stem from the German Federal Agency
for Geo-Information and Geodesy (http://www.bkg.bund.de).
• Polling data:
– Data on most important topics in Saxony/Bavaria come from Politbarometer sur-
veys. Data is made publicly available by GESIS under code ‘ZA3850’ (doi:10.4232/1.3850)
for 2002 and code ‘ZA5677’ (doi:10.4232/1.12171) for 2013.
7http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/. The data is not publicly available but has to be purchased.
8https://www.statistikdaten.bayern.de/, many thanks to Werner Kreuzholz and Benjamin Kaiser
at the agency.
9Many thanks to Kathrin Fischer at the agency for her support.
10We are grateful to Heike Bach from Vista for the provision of their data and to Martina Hodrius for her
help in preprocessing the GIS files.
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